Story
September 7, 2026
Inspur’s U.S. Offshoot Exposes the Gaps in Washington’s Chip Blacklist
Washington says its export-control regime protects national security, while investigators and industry analysts see a blacklist that Inspur may have sidestepped through affiliates and overseas data centers. Nvidia says it opposes diversion and relies on partners to comply, even as the reported supply chain raises fresh questions about oversight.
In 2020, the Trump administration put Inspur, a major Chinese server maker controlled by Shandong’s provincial government, on a list of companies linked to China’s military. Three years later, the Biden administration placed Inspur Group on the Entity List, saying it sought U.S. technology for military supercomputers. The designation barred U.S. shipments without a license—but applied to named entities, not automatically to every affiliate.1
That distinction quickly mattered. Soon after the 2023 blacklisting, the Inspur sign at a Silicon Valley office was replaced by Aivres, a newly formed U.S. subsidiary. The company allegedly continued its parent’s work while exploiting gaps in the rules; federal officials have begun examining its business, though the status of that inquiry is unclear.1
From April 2024 through February 2026, Aivres exported at least $5.6 billion in advanced technology from the United States to Southeast Asia, including more than $3 billion in systems equipped with Nvidia Blackwell chips and related equipment, according to trade-record analysis cited by The New York Times.1 The reported recipients included data centers and technology companies serving Alibaba and ByteDance. A separate route allegedly sent costly, unbranded servers from Malaysia to China, where newly established state-owned company Maginfra imported more than $700 million in servers over six months.1
Inspur, Aivres, Maginfra, Alibaba and ByteDance did not respond to requests for comment; Megaspeed, another recipient under U.S. scrutiny, declined to comment. Nvidia spokesman John Rizzo said the company does not support “diversion of products” and sells through reputable partners that work to comply with U.S. export controls.1
The administration maintains it has imposed the toughest modern export-control regime. Critics see a less convincing record: after some Inspur affiliates were later blacklisted, Aivres was not. SemiAnalysis analyst Jordan Nanos, citing shared servers, staff and offices, put the challenge bluntly: “Are they trying to block this company or not?”1